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Trademarks as Search-Engine Keywords: 
VVho, VVhat, VVhen? 
David A. Hyman* & David J. Franklyn** 
Most Internet searches result in unpaid (organic or algorithmic) results, 
and paid ads. The specific ads that are displayed are dictated by the user's 
search terms ("keywords"). In 2004, Google began offering trademarks for 
use as keywords on an unrestricted basis, followed in due course by other 
search engines. Once that happened, any entity (including sellers of competing 
products) could have their ads appear in response to a search for the 
trademarked product. Trademark owners responded by filing more than 100 
lawsuits in the United States and Europe, making the dispute the hottest 
controversy in the history of trademark law. Litigation has focused on 
purchases by competitors-giving the impression that competitors account for 
a large portion of such purchases. We find that competitors account for a 
relatively small percentage of keyword purchases, and many trademark owners 
purchase their own marks as keywords. We also find a high degree of 
fluctuation in the number of paid ads and the domain names to which those ads 
are linked. We conclude that the risk of widespread abuse is low. Trademark 
owners' objections seem to have more to do with objections to .free riding than 
with the zone of interests currently protected by U.S. trademark law. 
I. Introduction 
Most Internet searches result in unpaid (organic or algorithmic) results, 
along with paid ads. The specific ads that appear are dictated by the user's 
search terms ("keywords"). A search for "hotel in Miami" will return ads 
from individual hotels, travel web sites (e.g., Orbitz and Expedia), and 
consolidators. A search for a product or service will return ads for that 
product, as well as complementary and competing products and services. 
The advertisers pay the search engine when their ad is clicked, even if no 
sale ever results. 1 
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I. See Cost-Per-Click Bidding, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwordslbin/answer.py?hl 
=en&answer=2464960&topic=1713914&path=l713956-1713909&ctx=leftnav. 
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In 2004, Google began offering trademarks for use as keywords on an 
unrestricted basis, followed in due course by other search engines. Once 
that happened, any entity (including sellers of competing products) could 
have their ads appear in response to a search for the trademarked product. 
So, an Internet search for "Mercedes" predictably returns ads for Mercedes 
dealers and auto repair shops, but it may also return ads for Mercedes' 
competitors, such as BMW and Infiniti. Trademark owners responded by 
filing more than 1 00 lawsuits in the United States and Europe, making the 
dispute the hottest controversy in the history of trademark law.2 
In a previous article, we studied consumers' goals and expectations 
when using trademarks as search terms, and assessed whether there was a 
likelihood of confusion (which is the touchstone for trademark infringe-
ment) resulting from those purchases.3 In this Article, we report on the 
entities that are purchasing trademarks for use as keywords, and consider 
the economic significance of the reported patterns. 
Past litigation over the use of trademarks as keywords has focused 
almost entirely on the purchase of trademarks for use as keywords by 
entities that were competitors of the trademark owner.4 By definition, all of 
these "uses" of the trademark were without the permission of the trademark 
owner.5 This fact pattern in the litigated cases has given the impression that 
competitors account for a large portion of trademark-keyword purchases 
and use. We find, however, that competitors account for a relatively small 
percentage of keyword purchases. We also find a high degree of fluctuation 
2. A list of the filed cases we have been able to identify as of June 2012 is available from the 
authors on request. 
3. David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine Keywords: Much 
Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481 (2013). 
4. See id. at 497 ("[M)ost of the litigation involving trademarks as search engine keywords 
features competitors who are selling similar goods to those bearing the trademark .... "). Much of 
the litigation involved the trademark owner suing the entity that purchased the trademark for use 
as a keyword for trademark infringement. See id. at 497-98. But, some plaintiffs also sued 
Google, alleging direct infringement, contributory infringement, and in some instances, trademark 
dilution. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 550--52 (E.D. Va. 
2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 676 FJd 144, 167-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (vacating the lower 
court's granting of summary judgment against trademark dilution). 
5. Pun intended. We are alluding to the fact that early cases involved a pitched battle over 
whether the use of trademarks as keywords constituted a "use" in commerce. Franklyn & Hyman, 
supra note 3, at 504 ("Much of this work focuses on the 'trademark use' controversy hotly 
debated at the outset of keyword litigation. As that issue has waned in significance, articles and 
notes have increasingly focused on whether the initial interest confusion doctrine fits the online 
world." (citation omitted)); see also Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130--31 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of a claim that Google's use of Rescuecom's mark constituted an 
unauthorized use in commerce of that mark due to its likelihood of confusion to consumers). 
Rescuecom subsequently dropped the suit against Google-perhaps because it had purchased 
"Geek Squad" as a keyword, triggering a lawsuit against it by Best Buy. Tom Krazik, Rescuecom 
Drops Trademark Suit Against Google, CNET TECH CULTURE (Mar. 5, 2010, 10:44 AM), http:// 
www .cnet.com/news/rescuecom-drops-trademark -suit -against-google/. 
2014] Trademarks as Search-Engine Keywords 2119 
in the number of paid ads and the domain names to which those ads are 
linked. We conclude that the risk of widespread abuse is low. 
We also find that many trademark owners purchase their own marks as 
keywords-presumably in an attempt to ensure that their ads appear as 
prominently as possible. Trademark owners are apparently unwilling to 
rely solely on Google's algorithmic search to ensure prominent placement 
on the search-results page. Trademark owners may also be purchasing their 
own trademarks for defensive reasons-to keep competitors from doing so 
entirely, or raising their competitors' costs if they persist. 
Search engines obviously profit when trademarks are purchased as 
keywords, whether those purchases are by competitors or are defensive 
purchases by trademark owners. Given the low incidence of purchases of 
keywords by competitors and the likelihood that famous brand owners are 
likely to appear prominently in algorithmic-search results, our results raise 
questions about the cost-effectiveness of defensive keyword purchases by 
trademark owners. 
Part II provides some background on search engines, keyword 
searches, and the litigation over the use of trademarks as keywords. Part III 
presents details on our methodology. Part IV presents our results. Part V 
discusses our findings. Part VI concludes. 
II. Background on the Issues 
A. Overview 
Google began selling ads based on users' search term (i.e., keywords) 
in 2000.6 In 2002, the system (known as AdWords) took its current form 
(i.e., payment-per-click).7 In 2004, Google significantly loosened its policy 
on the purchase of trademarks as keywords. 8 
We describe the Adwords program in detail in an earlier article but 
provide a brief summary here. 9 Advertisers place bids, seeking to have 
their ads displayed when particular keywords are used as search terms. 10 
Whether a particular ad is displayed depends on various search-specific and 
6. Press Release, Google, Google Launches Self-Service Advertising Program (Oct. 23, 
2000), available at http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/pressrelease39.html. 
7. Press Release, Google, Google Introduces New Pricing for Popular Self-Service Online 
Advertising Program (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/select 
.html. 
8. Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1359-60 (2008). Prior to 2004, 
Google allowed trademarks to be used as keywords but would remove such ads if trademark 
owners complained. After 2004, Google no longer responded to complaints regarding the use of 
trademarks as keywords, meaning that their use was unrestricted. See id. at 1360. 
9. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 490-92. 
10. JIM JANSEN, UNDERSTANDING SPONSORED SEARCH: CORE ELEMENTS OF KEYWORD 
ADVERTISING 177 (2011); Peter O'Connor, Trademark Infringement in Pay-Per-Click Adver-
tising, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN £-BRANDING 148, 149 (Subir Bandyopadhyay ed., 2009). 
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bid-specific factors. 11 When users click on an ad, the advertiser pays 
Goog1e the amount it bid, whether a sale results or not. 12 
AdWords is responsible for most of Google's advertising revenue, 
which in 2012 totaled more than $43 billion. 13 Bing and Yahoo use an 
analogous Payment-Per-Click model. 14 In 2004, 7% of Google's total 
revenue was "driven by" trademarked keywords. 15 In 2009, Google 
estimated that allowing the unrestricted use of trademarks in ad text would 
result in at least $100 million in increased annual revenues16-small 
potatoes in terms of Google's overall revenue in that year ($23.65 billion), 
but still a significant amount ofmoney.17 
B. Search Engine Policies Regarding Trademark Usage 
We describe search engine policies regarding trademarks in detail in an 
earlier article, 18 so we simply summarize those matters here. The three 
major search engines (Google, Bing, and Yahoo) have comprehensive 
11. See, e.g., Actual Cost-Per-Click (CPC), GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/an 
swer/6297 (detailing how much a bidder will be charged per click, taking into account the Quality 
Score and the Ad Rank); Ad Position, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/ 
6300?hl=en (indicating that ad position depends on a combination of a bidder's Quality Score and 
bid amount); Check and Understand Quality Score, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/ 
answer/2454010 (defming "Quality Score," which attempts to calculate the relevance of an ad, 
keyword, and landing page to a person viewing them, and includes past click-through rates and 
performance in targeted markets and devices in its calculation); Using Keyword Matching 
Options, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/2497836?hl=en&topic=16083&ctx 
=topic (explaining how to broaden or narrow keyword matches). 
12. Cost-Per-Click Bidding, supra note l. Google also has a program that allows bids based 
on conversion to actual sales, known as cost-per-acquisition bidding. Cost-Per-Acquisition (CPA) 
Bidding, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/answer/2472713. 
13. 2013 Financial Tables, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/financiaVtables.html. See 
also Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 483 ("These lofty market capitalizations are almost 
entirely attributable to the income generated by the advertising that accompanies search results."); 
Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profitability, WIRED, June 
2009, at I 08, 113, available at http://www. wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17 -06/nep 
_googlenomics (quoting then-Google CEO Eric Schmidt that after the implementation of a new 
version of AdWords, '" [a ]II of a sudden we realized we were in the auction business."'). 
14. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 492 (citing Bing Ads, BING, http://advertise 
.bingads.microsoft.com/en-uslbing-ads-how-it-works?tab=costs&s_cid=us_smb_a_product_ 
costs). 
15. Joint Appendix Vol. IX, Tab 41 - Ex. 6 - Google Three Ad Policy Changes at 4265, 
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2007), available at 
http://digitalcommons.Iaw.scu.edu/appendix/33. This figure would likely have been higher if 
Goog1e had not been honoring requests from trademark owners to disable the use of trademarks in 
keywords and ad text. Jd. at 4263. 
16. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 492 (citing Joint Appendix Vol. IX, Tab 41 -Ex. 17-
E-mail from Baris Gultekin (Google Product Manager Director) at 4382-83, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. 
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2007), available at http://digital 
commons.law.scu.edu/appendix/55). 
17. Press Release, Google, Google Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2009 Results 
(Jan. 21, 2010), https://investor.google.com/pdf/2009Q4_earnings_google.pdf. 
18. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 492-95. 
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policies regarding trademark usage and infringement. Bing and Yahoo's 
policies are identical because of a search-alliance agreement. 19 Google 
expanded its policy in 2009, allowing advertisers in more than 190 
countries to purchase trademark keywords.20 None of the three search 
engines actively police the use of trademarks ex ante; instead, all three use 
an approach analogous to the "notice and takedown" system in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.21 However, search engines will only respond to 
complaints by trademark owners when the offending use meets the 
requirements set by the search engines.22 
As noted above, Google has allowed unrestricted purchase of 
trademarks for use as keywords since 2004.23 Bing and Yahoo formally 
adopted a similar policy in 2011.24 
C. Academic Scholarship: Legal and Empirical 
The use of trademarks as keywords has attracted considerable attention 
from legal academics and the trademark bar.25 Attention initially focused 
on the "trademark use" issue,26 but articles have increasingly focused on 
19. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 492 (citing Dylan Benton, What Every PPC 
Advertiser Needs to Know about the Yahoo! Bing Search Alliance, TRIMARK (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.trimarksolutions.com/inside/yahoo-bing-merger/what-every-ppc-advertiser-needs-to-
know-about-the-yahoo-bing-search-alliance and Pamela Parker, Bing & Yahoo Align with 
Google's Trademark Rules for Search Ads, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 15, 2011, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.searchengineland.com/bing-yahoo-align-with-googles-trademark-rules-64902). 
20. David Naffziger, Google Modifies Global AdWords Trademark Policy, BRANDVERITY 
(May 5, 2009), http:/lblog.brandverity.corn/228/google-modifies-global-adwords-trademark-poli 
cy; Barry Schwartz, Google AdWords Opens up Trademarked Bidding to Most Countries, 
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 5, 2009, 4:34 PM), http://searchengineland.com/google-adwords-
opens-up-trademarked-bidding-to-most-countries-18628. 
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)(iii) (2012) (prohibiting liability for service providers for 
copyright infringement from holding copyrighted information on a system or network if the 
service provider expeditiously removes or restricts access to the material upon learning of the 
infringement). 
22. E.g., AdWords Trademark Policy, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/ 
answer.py?hl=en&answer=6118 ("If a trademark owner files a complaint with Google about the 
use of their trademark in AdWords ads, Google will investigate and may enforce certain 
restrictions on the use of that trademark in AdWords text ads."); Hortensia Lopez-Nakano, Tips 
from the adCenter Editorial Team: Intellectual Property Policy for the Trademark Owner, BING 
ADS (Dec. I, 20 II), http://advertise.bingads.rnicrosoft.com/en-uslblogpost/1 05655/bing-ads-blog. 
23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 
F.3d 144, !51 (4th Cir. 2012). 
24. See Eric Goldman, Microsoft Adopts Google-Sty/e Trademark Policy for Keyword Adver-
tising, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/ 
20 11/02/microsoft_adopt.htrn. 
25. A list of more than fifty articles on the subject is available from the authors on request. 
Our earlier work references a number of these articles as well. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, 
at 504-06. 
26. The debate was over whether the defendant-advertisers and search engines were using 
plaintiffs mark as a trademark. E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 779-84 (2004). That controversy 
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whether the "initial interest confusion" doctrine should be applied to the 
online world. 27 
We have found very little empirical work on the use of trademarks as 
keywords. O'Connor studied ninety trademarks for hotels throughout the 
world, and found that "abuse is rampant," with a majority of searches 
including ads for third-party websites.28 However, Rosso and Jansen 
analyzed the same issue using 1 00 prominent trademarks and found that 
only 2.7%-6.4% were competitors' "piggybacking" ads.29 Rosso and 
Jansen concluded that "competitive piggybacking does not appear to be 
a ... widespread phenomenon. "30 
Finally, Blake, Nosko, and Tadelis recently conducted a controlled 
study of the impact of ad purchases on eBay sales. 31 They found "new and 
infrequent users are positively influenced by ads but that more frequent 
users, whose purchasing behavior is not influenced by ads account for most 
has largely subsided, with virtually all courts holding that the sale of trademarks as keywords may 
be actionable, as long as infringement in the form of confusion or dilution is shown. See, e.g., 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2009). 
27. See, e.g., Daniel C. Glazer & Dev R. Dhamija, Revisiting Initial Interest Confusion on the 
Internet, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 952, 953 (2005) (asserting that the expansion of initial interest 
confusion on the Internet is unnecessary); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet 
Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 565 (2005) [hereinafter Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy] 
(arguing that initial interest confusion doctrine is "predicated on multiple mistaken and 
empirically unsupported assumptions about searcher behavior"); David M. Klein & Daniel C. 
Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest ConfUsion on the Internet, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1035 
(2003) (contending that the initial interest confusion doctrine is unnecessary in the context of the 
Internet); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trade-
mark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 105, 169 (2005) (noting that many judges lack familiarity with 
Internet technology and therefore courts are unable to assess a reasonable consumer's experience 
on the Internet); cf Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 397 (2009) 
(arguing that redirection of consumers to competing brands is widely accepted by courts in an 
offline-retail context). 
28. Peter O'Connor, Pay-per-Click Search Engine Advertising: Are Hotel Trademarks Being 
Abused?, 50 CORNELL HOSPITALITY Q. 232, 240 (2009) (fmding that ads appeared in the vast 
majority of searches and that third parties accounted for the majority of the ads). 
29. Mark A. Rosso & Bernard J. Jansen, Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search 
Advertising, 27 COMM. ASS'N FOR INFO. SYS. 81, 88 (2010). The most common forms of 
piggybacking are resellers' promotion of the brand or other functions that assist in selling the 
product, such as coupons or free samples. Such promotional piggybacking accounted for 55'%-
78% of ads, depending on the search engine. !d. Orthogonal piggybacking, the results of which 
usually included informational websites about the brand or the underlying company, accounted for 
16%-42% of ads, depending on the search engine. Id. Rosso and Jansen note that the use of 
trademarked terms by competitors is extremely low. See id. at 89 ("[The] six competitive 
piggybacking ad occurrences are the result of just two ads .... "). 
30. !d. at 81. 
31. Thomas Blake et al., Consumer Heterogeneity and Paid Search Effectiveness: A Large 
Scale Field Experiment (Apr. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.haas 
.berkeley.edu/stadelis/Tadelis.pdf ("[W]e show that returns from paid search are a fraction of 
conventional non-experimental estimates. As an extreme case, we show that brand-keyword ads 
have no measurable short-term benefits."). 
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of the advertising expenses, resulting in average returns that are negative."32 
If these results are generalizable, they call into question the cost-
effectiveness of defensive purchases of trademarks as keywords by 
trademark owners.33 
III. Methods 
We obtained a list of well-known trademarks from the International 
Trademark Association (INTA).34 According to an INTA representative, 
the list was compiled based on the frequency of inquiries to the INT A 
Trademark Hotline regarding active U.S. registered trademarks.35 After 
excluding duplicate trademarks used in different lines of business (e.g., 
Agree is used for shampoo and conditioner, but also for agricultural 
insecticide), we were left with a total of2,474 unique trademarks?6 
We hired a programmer to develop a computer program that would run 
an Internet search for each trademark in the full INT A list, using each of the 
three specified search engines. For each trademark-search engine com-
bination, the program captured a count of the number of unpaid and paid 
links, the URLs associated with each of those links, and a PDF of the 
primary search results. The program also captured a PDF of the web page 
at each of the first ten unpaid and paid links. The program excluded social-
networking sites, news, maps, and pictures from its definition of paid and 
unpaid links. For mysterious reasons the program repeatedly crashed on a 
dozen specific trademarks, leaving us with 2,462 trademarks (hereinafter, 
the "full INT A list"). During fall 2010, using multiple Apple computers in 
Champaign and Chicago, we ran all 2,462 trademarks twice, with a two-
month gap between the first and second run. 
32. !d. 
33. The results may not be generalizable because of factors unique to eBay's market position. 
eBay is likely to rank highly in algorithmic search, independent of purchased ads; the same may 
not be true for other entities. !d. at 20-22. Alternatively, the results may not be generalizable 
because eBay's advertising strategy is poorly targeted. See Larry Kim, Dear eBay, Your Ads 
Don't Work Because They Suck, WORDSTREAM BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.wordstream 
.com/blog/ws/2013/03/13/dear-ebay-its-not-adwords-its-you (criticizing eBay's use of Dynamic 
Keyword Insertion, a process that dynamically inserts the user's query into an ad's headline; "For 
the last 10 years or so, they've been running ads on the most ridiculous things including stuff that 
doesn't exist .... "). 
34. Trademark Checklist, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, http://applications.inta.org/apps/trade 
mark_ checklist/. 
35. E-mail from Randi J. Mustello, Dir. of Publ'g, INTA, to author (July 13, 2010, 11:33 
CDT) (on file with authors). 
36. INTA flags "duplicate" trademarks by adding the number"!" after the trademark name. 
So, the INTA database includes both "Agree" for agricultural insecticide, and "Agree!" for 
shampoo and conditioner. Coding was based on the better known use of the trademark (as 
determined by both authors), regardless of whether INTA had coded the better known use as the 
primary or secondary trademark. So, we coded Agree as shampoo and conditioner, rather than 
agricultural insecticide, even though INT A had classified the agricultural-insecticide use as the 
primary trademark. 
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We developed a standardized coding protocol for classifying unpaid 
and paid links and applied that protocol to code the first five paid and 
unpaid links in each trademark-search engine combination. McCarthy 
Institute research fellows from the University of San Francisco were 
responsible for coding the search output from the first run of the full INT A 
list. The coding protocol was refined over time to reflect feedback from the 
research fellows and to capture the full range of search output. We had 
multiple meetings with the research fellows to validate the coding 
categories and to ensure that there was consistency in coding across 
research fellows. Coding was conducted throughout fall 2010 and was 
completed by January 2011. In the end, the coding protocol had the 
following eleven specific categories for classifying the entity behind the 
link: 
• Trademark owner; 
• Vendor selling trademarked goods only; 
• Vendor selling the trademarked goods as well as competing 
goods; 
• Vendor selling competing goods only; 
• Vendor of complementary goods and services; 
• Employment website; 
• Collateral information/sales opportunity vendor;37 
• Collateral information provider; 
• Coupon website; 
• Generic usage; 
• Other. 
Because it was extremely time-consuming to collect and code PDFs 
for all of the linked webpages, only the first run was analyzed in this 
fashion. However, we did conduct a second run of the full INT A data set in 
February 2011 and analyzed the results at a higher level of generality. 
Using selected trademarks from the full INT A list, we also assessed 
the degree of volatility in our results using two different strategies. First, 
we randomly selected 600 trademarks from the full INT A list and ran them 
through the same program 34 times during three two-week periods during 
October, November, and December 2011.38 
Then, during winter 2012, we asked six people (one of whom was one 
of the authors) to identify the top 10% of the trademarks in the full INT A 
list, judged by which trademarks were the most popular/prominent/ 
37. A collateral information/sales opportunity vendor would be a web site like price 
grabber.com or eBay. 
38. A list of these trademarks is available from the authors on request. 
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recognizable.39 After aggregating votes, we identified the 182 most popular 
trademarks (hereinafter, the "Big Brands"), and ran them through the same 
program 22 times during a two-week period during February-March 2012. 
IV. Results 
A. Overview 
We begin with some simple descriptive statistics. Table 1 analyzes the 
number of mean and median paid links and the percentage of trademarks 
with no paid links, broken down by search engine, for the first run of our 
full data set (totaling approximately 2,500 trademarks). 
Table 1: Paid Links Statistics- Full INTA List 
Paid links ------sing 
Search Engine 
Google Yahoo 
Mean 2.2 2.7 7.1 
Median 1 2 8 
No paid links 48% 29% 15% 
Mean and median number of paid links, and percent of trademarks with no paid links, 
broken out by search engine for full INTA list, first run (2,462 trademarks). 
As Table 1 reflects, we find substantial differences across search 
engines. For example, Bing and Google have similar mean paid links (2.2 
and 2.7, respectively), while Yahoo has almost three times as many mean 
paid links (7.1). We find the same pattern with median paid links (1 for 
Bing, 2 for Google, and 8 for Yahoo). However, Bing had a substantially 
higher number of trademarks with no paid links (48%)--almost twice as 
many as Google (29%), and three times as many as Yahoo (15%). We now 
turn to the question of what types of entities are purchasing these paid links. 
39. A list of these trademarks is available from the authors on request. . 
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B. Who's Buying Paid Links? 
As noted previously, most of the litigation involving the use of 
trademarks as keywords has involved the purchase of trademarks by 
competitors.40 But is that actually representative of the universe of trans-
actions? Table 2 shows what type of entities are purchasing trademarks as 
keywords for the first five paid and unpaid links.41 The third column in 
Table 2 shows the difference in the percentages for paid and unpaid links. 
We present the results for unpaid search results as a control, indicating the 
frequency of various types of links absent the profit motive provided by 
keyword sales. 
Table 2: Frequency of Link Type-First Five Paid and Unpaid Links 
Type of Link 
%of Links 
Paid Unpaid (Paid-Unpaid) 
Vendor of TM products and 
26.6% 3.3% 23.3% competing products 
Collateral information and 
24.3% 2.6% 21.7% 
sales opportunity vendor 
TMowner 13.2% 42.3% -29.1% 
Vendor ofTM products 
6.0% 3.3% 2.7% only 
Vendor of competing 
6.2% 2.9% 3.2% 
products only 
Generic use 6.0% 6.0% 0.0% 
Other 5.8% 2.4% 3.4% 
Vendor of collateral or 
complementary goods and 4.9% 1.3% 3.7% 
services 
Collateral information 
3.0% 35.4% -32.3% 
provider 
Employment website 2.1% 0.2% 1.9% 
Coupon website 1.8% 0.2% 1.6% 
Coding results for 2,462 trademarks, totaling 18,733 paid links (3,982 for Google, 
5,396 for Bing, and 9,355 for Yahoo) and 36,945 unpaid links from the first run of 
full INT A list. 
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
41. Table 2 and all subsequent tables use the number of returned paid links as the 
denominator for computing percentages-so search results with zero paid links drop out of the 
analysis. 
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As Table 2 makes clear, there are substantial differences in link type 
when we compare paid and unpaid links. However, competitor-only links 
accounted for only 6.2% of paid links and 2.9% of unpaid links-
comparable to, or less than the figures accounted for by generic use of the 
trademark (6.0% for both paid and unpaid links). In absolute terms, the 
largest differences are observed in four categories: vendor of trademarked 
product and competing products; collateral information provider/sales 
opportunity vendor; trademark owner; and collateral information provider. 
To make direct comparison of the results for these four categories easier, 
Figure 1 plots the results for paid and unpaid links for each category and a 










Figure 1: Source of Links for Full INT A 














I ' ' ' ' 
33% 
0%+---------,---- -----.----------. 
Vendor ofTM and Collateral info TM Owner Collateral info All Other 
competing goods provider+ gateway provider 
Source ~f paid and unpaid links for first run of full INT A data set. 
Do these patterns vary by search engine? We found little evidence of 
variation (at least, as judged by coding category) in the unpaid links 
returned by each of the three search engines. Each search engine had a 
peak for trademark owners of 39%-45%, and a peak for collateral infor-
mation providers of 32%-35%. Similarly, competitors were consistently 
3% of unpaid links, regardless of the search engine. 
We find somewhat more variation (again judging by coding category) 
in the paid links returned by each of the three search engines. Figure 2 
provides detail on the source of paid ads using the same categories as in 
Figure l, but this time broken down by search engine. 
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Percent of paid links in full !NT A trademark ron (fall2011). 
As Figure 2 indicates, all three search engines had roughly the same 
combined total for vendors of the trademarked product and competing 
goods and for collateral information/sales opportunity vendors, but Yahoo 
had far fewer of the former and more of the latter, while Google had the 
opposite pattern. The peak for trademark owner ranged from 1 0% (Yahoo) 
to 19% (Bing). 
So far, our analysis has aggregated the first five paid links. But, does 
search position make a difference in our results? Figure 3 presents the 
results when we disaggregate our findings by link position, comparing 
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Figure 3: Source of Paid Links by Link Position 
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2129 
All Other 
Percentage source of paid links for first run of full INTA data set, broken out by link position 
(first and second through fifth). 
Figure 3 makes it clear that link position matters in understanding the 
patterns of who is purchasing trademarks as keywords. Trademark owners 
are responsible for only 13% of all paid links, but if we limit the analysis to 
the first paid-link position, trademark owners account for almost one-third 
(31%) of paid links. As link position increases, trademark owners steadily 
disappear from the mix: accounting for 11% of the second paid-link 
position, 6% of the third paid-link position, 5% of the fourth paid-link 
position, and 4% of the fifth paid-link position. 
We find the opposite pattern when we focus on collateral information 
provider/purchasing gateway, which is more likely to occupy the second 
paid-link position (and far more likely to occupy the third through fifth 
paid-link position) than the first paid-link position. We find similar, but 
less dramatic results for vendors of trademarked and competing goods, 
which are more likely to occupy the second through fifth paid-link position, 
as compared to the first paid-link position. 
To summarize, when trademark owners purchase paid links, they 
gravitate toward the top spot. Since trademark owners do not seem to want 
to appear in lower ranked paid-link positions, these spots are snapped up by 
other entities-with a disproportionate share purchased by websites offer-
ing information and a link to a website where one can purchase the branded 
good, or the branded good and other competing goods. 
Figure 4 breaks out the results in Figure 3 by search engine for the first 
paid-link position. 
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Figure 4: Source of First Paid Link by Search Engine 
-ill- Bing ---Google -6-Yahoo 
Vendor ofTM and Collateral info TM Owner Collateral info 
competing goods provider+ provider 
gateway 
Source of first paid link for first run of full INT A data set. 
All Other 
As Figure 4 demonstrates, the 31% overall trademark-owner share of 
the first paid link position42 results from averaging divergent results for 
Yahoo (25%), Bing (33%), and Google (36%). We find similar divergence 
for collateral information provider/purchasing gateway; the 15% overall 
share of the first paid link position43 results from averaging divergent 
results for Yahoo (20%), Bing (15%), and Google (9%). 
C. Volatility 
Our findings to this point are based on a snapshot of search results. 
But, are these findings stable over time? We now turn to that issue. 
As a first cut at determining that issue, we replicated the initial search 
during February 2011-this time on a smaller number of computers in 
Champaign, Illinois. As before, for each trademark-search engine com-
bination, the program captured a count of the number of unpaid and paid 
links and a PDF of the primary search results. However, we did not grab 
PDFs of unpaid and paid websites, because we did not plan to recode the 
results. Instead, our goal was to determine whether the number of paid 
links remained reasonably stable, and, to the extent possible, whether we 
could match up the coding results from our earlier analysis. 
As Table 3 reflects, we found substantial differences in the number of 
paid links between our first and second searches. 
42. See supra Figure 3. 
43. See supra Figure 3. 
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Table 3: Comparison of First and Second Run 
Paid Links Run 
Search Engine 
Bing Goog1e Yahoo 
Mean 
1st 2.2 2.7 7.1 
2nd 0.6 1.1 1 
Median 
1st 1 2 8 
2nd 0 0 0 
None 
1st 48% 29% 15% 
2na 72% 53% 71% 
Mean and median number of paid links, and percent of trademarks with no paid links, broken out 
by search engine for full INTA list, first and second runs (2,462 trademarks). 
The second run had lower mean and median paid links across all three 
search engines than the first run. During the second run, Google and Yahoo 
had roughly the same number of mean paid links (1.1 and 1, respectively), 
while Bing had roughly half as many (0.6). All three search engines had 
the same median number of paid links (0) during the second run. Bing and 
Yahoo have a very high percentage of trademarks with no paid links-at a 
level well above that observed in the first run for any search engine (72% 
and 71%, respectively). The disjunction between the results from the first 
and second runs suggests that paid search results may be quite volatile. 
But, are we capturing a one-time blip, a long-term trend, or simple 
volatility? 
To analyze that issue, we selected a random sample of 600 trademarks, 
drawn from the trademarks used in the earlier searches. 44 During fall 20 11, 
we ran these 600 trademarks through all three search engines a total of 34 
times during three two-week periods in October (10 runs), November 
(12 runs), and December 2011 (12 runs).45 To minimize the influence of 
external factors, all searches were run on the same Apple computer in 
Champaign, Illinois. Figure 5 shows the mean paid links for each search 
engine for each of the 34 runs of the 600 trademark data set. 
44. A list of the 600 trademarks is obtainable from the authors on request. 
45. The October runs were conducted from October 13, 2011 until October 27, 2011. The 
November runs were conducted from November 10, 2011 until November 23, 2011. The 
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Figure 5: Mean Paid Links Per Trademark (600 TM Runs) 
_.,..Bing .....e-ooogle =C=>Yahoo 
........ " 
\ 
Mean paid links in sequential runs of 600 trademarks during October, November, 
and December 20 II. 
As Figure 5 indicates, the frequency of paid links varies substantially 
over time. During the first two-week period (October 2011), the number of 
paid links was stable, with Google averaging two paid links per trademark, 
and Bing and Yahoo averaging less than one paid link per trademark. 
During the second two-week period (November 2011), the initial run had a 
far higher number of paid links for Yahoo and Bing (7.8 and 4.5 paid links 
per trademark, respectively), but both trended downward dramatically 
thereafter and ended at roughly the same level that prevailed during the first 
two-week period. Google had a different pattern, with lower paid links 
throughout the second two-week period than during the first two-week 
period. During the third two-week period (December 2011), Google 
remained at the level that had prevailed during the second two-week period, 
while Yahoo and Bing spiked and remained elevated for four runs until 
dropping back to the level that had prevailed during the first two-week 
period. 
What about the percentage of trademarks that had zero paid links? 
How did that vary by search engine and over time? Figure 6 analyzes that 
ISSUe. 
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Percentage of 600 trademarks that had no paid links during any given run. 
As Figure 6 demonstrates, we find relatively little volatility in the 
number of trademarks with zero paid links in the first two-week period, but 
we find substantially more volatility in the second and third two-week 
periods for Bing and Yahoo. Google averaged around 35% of trademarks 
with zero paid links in the first run versus roughly 65% in the second and 
third runs. We also find that the share of zero paid links in Bing and Yahoo 
closely track one another. 
Finally, we repeatedly ran our sample of 182 Big Brands over a two-
week period in February and March 2012. Figure 7 shows the mean 
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Figure 7: Mean Paid Links (Big Brands Sequential Run Runs) 
_,_Bing .,._Google ....e-yahoo 
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Run Series 
Mean paid links for 182 Big Brands in 22 sequential runs from February 21, 2012-March 5, 2012. 
Figure 7 shows that Bing and Yahoo have a high degree of volatility in 
the mean number of paid links compared to Goog1e. Yahoo consistently 
has the most paid links, and Google consistently has the least. The pattern 
for Bing generally tracks that ofYahoo, although the peaks are lower. 
Figure 8 analyzes the percentage of the Big Brands for which there 
were zero paid links in each of these sequential runs, again broken out by 
search engine. 
Figure 8: Percentage of Zero Paid Links (Big Brands Sequential Runs) 
Run Series 
Percentage of 182 Big Brands with zero paid links in 22 sequential runs from February 21,2012-
March 5, 2012. 
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As Figure 8 demonstrates, roughly half of the Big Brand trademarks 
had no paid links whatsoever when run through Google, with volatile but 
generally lower percentages for Bing and Yahoo. 
D. Meta Comparisons 
We also compared the domain names associated with the first five paid 
and unpaid links for each of the three data sets we employed (full INTA list, 
600 trademark list, and Big Brands list). Table 4 presents the results of that 
analysis. 
T bl 4 D a e : . s om am ource o fP "d d U a1 an "dL" k npa1 lD s 
FulliNTA 600TM Big Brands 
Paid Un-paid Paid Un-paid Paid Un-paid 
.com 94.5% 80.4% 96.5% 81.9% 95.4% 86.0% 
.org 1.2% 11.9% 1.2% 11.9% 1.1% 10.6% 
.net 3.3% 2.3% 1.4% 1.8% 2.8% 0.6% 
.edu 0.1% 1.1% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 0.6% 
Other 0.9% 4.3% 0.8% 3.5% 0.6% 2.2% 
Percent of domains by paid and unpaid links and by runs. Any domain with <I% 
across all run-link combinations was treated as "other." 
As Table 4 indicates, the ".com" domain accounts for approximately 
96% of paid links for all three data sets, but a somewhat more modest share 
(80.4%-86%) of unpaid links. Conversely, the ".org" domain accounts for 
only 1% of paid links and 10.6%-11.9% of unpaid links. We find only 
modest differences when we compare different data sets, compared to the 
differences between paid and unpaid links. When we examined the 
breakdown of link types within each domain, we found that job-search 
websites were heavily skewed toward the ".net" domain, but otherwise 
found no consistent patterns. 
We next analyzed the issue of "advertiser overlap." Are search 
engines selling keywords to the same entities, or does each search engine 
present unique paid content? Using the domain name for each paid ad, we 
calculated the extent to which each search engine had unique versus 
common advertisers for each trademark. To do so, we computed the degree 
of overlap for each trademark, and then averaged those results across all 
trademarks within each data set.46 Figure 9 shows the results of that 
analysis. 
46. For example, assume that for a given trademark, the Bing search resulted in two ads (by A 
and B); the Google search resulted in two ads (C and D); and the Yahoo search resulted in four 
ads (A, C, E, and F). Bing and Google would each have one-sixth unique ads, and Yahoo would 
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Figure 9: Sponsor Overlap Between Search Engine 
Full INT A List 
600 TMRuns 
have one-third unique ads. Bing and Yahoo would have common ads of one-sixth, as would 
Google and Yahoo. There would be no ads common to all three search engines, nor to Bing and 
Google. This process would be repeated for all trademarks in the data set, and then the trademark-
specific results would be averaged to arrive at the percentages reported in Figure 9. 
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Big Brands 
Sponsor overlap between search engines using domain name to calculate overlap. Overlap is 
computed for each trademark, and then averaged across all trademarks within each data set. For 
multiple runs (600 Trademark and Big Brands), we compute per-trademark results, and then 
average across all trademarks in the data set. 
As Figure 9 indicates, we find a high percentage of unique advertisers 
(as measured by the domain name of the advertiser) in the largest data set, 
but as the data set shrinks (particularly when we focus on Big Brands), the 
degree of shared advertisers rises dramatically, particularly for Bing and 
Yahoo. 
E. Drilling Down on the Risk of Diversion/Infringement 
Next, we examined these risks of diversion at a trademark-specific 
level. Even if competitor-only links account for only 6.2% of paid links, 
they might account for a much higher percentage of the paid links for a 
specific group of trademarks. The owners of trademarks that attract mostly 
competitor-only ads might have a very different view of the merits than 
trademark owners who are not on the receiving end of such ads. The 
presence of competitor-only links in organic search results complicates 
matters further; if Bing, Google, and Yahoo "think" that a competitor-only 
link is a good response to a particular search query when they are not being 
paid to reach that determination, it is far from clear that we should condemn 
the sale and purchase of trademarks as keywords, even when direct 
competitors are involved.47 
47. As noted above, we are implicitly treating organic search results as the "control" for the 
paid ads. Thus, to the extent organic search results include competitor-only links, we would 
expect to find them in paid ads. It is only their incremental presence in paid ads compared to 
organic search results that is noteworthy. For a very different take on this issue, see Lisa 
Larrimore Oullette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 351, 354-55 
(20 14) (proposing that courts should use the presence of alleged infringer-competitors in organic 
search results as a measure of the likelihood of confusion). 
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Table 5 provides a first cut at this issue, with a simple four-cell box, 
indicating how many trademarks have or don't have any competitor-only 
links, broken out for organic search and paid ads. 
Table 5: Distribution of Competitor-Only Links 
Links for Competitor Only 
(Paid Ads 
No Yes All 
No 
1819 378 2197 
Links for (73.7%) (15.3%) (89%) 
Competitor 
139 131 270 Only Yes 
(Organic (5.6%) (5.3%) (10.9%) 
Search) All 
1958 509 2467 
79.4% 20.6% 100% 
As Table 5 indicates, almost 74% of trademarks have no competitor-
only links-and an additional 5.6% of trademarks have competitor-only 
links in organic search results but not in paid ads. Thus, only 20.6% of 
trademarks have competitor-only links in paid ads only, or in both paid ads 
and organic search results. 
Table 6 continues the analysis, focusing on the number of trademarks 
that have a specific number of competitor-only links in paid-ad and organic 
search results. 
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Table 6: Distribution of Competitor-Only Links by Trademark 
Paid Ads Organic Search 
Number of 
Number of Percent of Number Percent 
Competitor 
TMs TMs ofTMs ofTMs 
Only Links 
0 1958 79.4% 2197 89.1% 
1 255 10.3% 81 3.3% 
2 114 4.6% 51 2.1% 
3 57 2.3% 33 1.3% 
4 30 1.2% 22 0.9% 
5+ 59 2.2% 83 3.4% 
All 2495 100% 2495 100% 
Since we coded up to fifteen paid ads, a na'ive interpretation of Table 6 
would be that competitor-only links rarely account for a majority of paid 
ads. But, not all trademarks obtained fifteen paid ads (although all but one 
had fifteen organic search results). Accordingly, in Table 7 we compute the 
"market share" of competitor-only links relative to paid-ad and organic 
search results. 
Table 7: Distribution of Competitor-Only Links by Trademark 
Paid Ads Organic Search 
Number of 
Number of Percent of Number Percent 
Competitor 
TMs TMs ofTMs ofTMs 
Only Links 
0% 1731 70.2% 2196 89.0% 
0-10% 132 5.4% 81 3.3% 
10-20% 164 6.6% 84 3.4% 
20-30% 52 2.1% 22 0.9% 
30-40% 64 2.6% 34 1.4% 
40-50% 26 1.1% 9 0.4% 
50%+ 69 2.8% 40 1.6% 
No links 229 9.2% 1 0.0% 
All 2467 100% 2467 100.0% 
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As Table 7 reflects, for only 69 trademarks (2.8% of all trademarks) do 
we find competitor-only links account for 50% or more of paid ads. Most 
of these trademarks attract relatively few paid ads; of the 69 trademarks, the 
mean number of paid ads for all three search engines combined is 6.8. If 
we limit the analysis to trademarks where competitor-only links accounted 
for I 00% of paid ads, the mean number of paid ads for all three search 
engines combined is 2.5. And, some of these 69 trademarks have 
competitor-only links in organic search results, which should be subtracted 
from the reported percentages to arrive at the "true" market share of 
competitor-only links in paid ads. Finally, because a competitor can engage 
in nominative fair use, the fact that a link is competitor-only does not 
necessarily establish trademark infringement. Thus, 2.8% represents a 
ceiling, rather than a point estimate of the frequency of trademark 
infringement. 
F. Who Is the Big Dog? 
If competitor-only links do not dominate the paid-ad space, who does? 
Which entities are most likely to purchase a specific trademark as a 
keyword? To evaluate that issue, we focused on the 38 trademarks that 
were included in both the second and third data sets. These trademarks 
were run a total of 56 times through each search engine. For each 
trademark-search engine combination, we identified the domain names that 
appeared most frequently. Table 8 provides the results of this analysis for 
fourteen trademarks, which are illustrative of the observed patterns.48 
48. We selected these fourteen trademarks because they reflected the various patterns of 
domain names we observed in the full data set of thirty-eight trademarks that were run fifty-six 
times. Results for the remaining trademarks are obtainable from the authors on request. 
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Table 8: Top Paid Link Across All Searches 
Name of Search Most Frequent Paid Ad No. of Ads 
TM Engine (Domain Name) 
Bing shopadidas.com 78 
Adidas Google shopadidas.com 26 
Yahoo jcpenney.com 35 
American 
Bing aa.com 50 
Airlines 
Google None 0 
Yahoo aa.com 51 
Bing store.apple.com 72 
Apple Google store.app1e.com 56 
Yahoo store.apple.com 91 
Baskin-
Bing go-get-coupons.com 17 
Robbins 
Google baskinrobbins.com 22 
Yahoo go-get-coupons.com 37 
Bing budshop.com 38 
Budweiser Google facebook.com 12 
Yahoo budshop.com 85 
Bing clinique.com 90 
Clinique Goog1e nordstrom.com 10 
Yahoo Iancome-usa.com 72 
Bing fritolay.jobsradar.com 25 
Frito-Lay Google bright. com 9 
Yahoo indeed. com 33 
Bing music-oasis. com 14 
Froot Loops Goo~de download-fiuity-loops.com 7 
Yahoo music-oasis. com 40 





Yahoo gatorade.com 56 
Harley-
Bing amazon.com 16 
Google harley-davidson.com 17 
Davidson 
Yahoo calibex.com 36 
Bing everything-neon.com 8 
Michelob Goog1e michelobultra.com 54 
Yahoo everything-neon.com 21 
Bing couponsponge.com 18 
Nabisco Google kraftrecipes.com keebler.com 1 
Yahoo couponsponge.com 32 
Bing revlon.com 38 
Revlon Goog1e drugstore.com 24 
Yahoo revlon.buymebeauty.com 44 
Bing toyota. com 62 
Toyota Google toyota.dealersclearinglots.com 36 
Yahoo toyota.reply.com 55 
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Table 8 demonstrates that trademark owners routinely purchase their 
own trademarks for use as keywords-and in some instances are the sole 
purchasing entity (e.g., American Airlines and Apple).49 We also find a 
mix of other purchaser types, including entities selling the branded product 
or complementary products, coupon sites, price-aggregation sites, and 
occasional oddities. Direct competitors are conspicuous by their absence. 5° 
G. Regression Analysis 
We conducted extensive regression analysis of our results, using both 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regression. The results were 
unimpressive.51 As expected, Google had fewer paid links than Bing and 
Yahoo, and Yahoo had more paid links than Bing. We found no evidence 
that trademarks with more unpaid links (which we assumed correlated with 
greater visibility and consumer demand) had more paid ads. The absolute 
number of paid ads was higher when the trademark owner purchased at 
least one paid ad. 
V. Discussion 
Our findings provide useful context for the ongoing dispute over the 
use of trademarks as keywords, as well as for some larger issues. 
A. Trademarks as Keywords: Much Ado About Something? 
Litigation over the use of trademarks as keywords has been the hottest 
issue in trademark law during the past few years,52 but the litigated cases 
give a deeply misleading picture of the issue. Very few trademarks are 
being purchased as keywords by direct competitors of the branded 
product. 53 Instead, the most frequent purchasers are those selling the 
49. Google does not include any paid ads for American Airlines, presumably reflecting the 
settlement of the 2004 lawsuit between American Airlines and Google. But see Eric Goldman, 
American Airlines and Google Settle Keyword Advertising Lawsuit, TECH. & MARKETING L. 
BLOG (July 19, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/07/american_airlin_l.htm 
("Based on this data, my initial hypothesis is that Google did not make any special concessions to 
American Airlines to block keyword ads on their trademarks."). 
50. Cf ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES I, 22 
(Book-of-the-Month Club Inc. 1994). While investigating a murder, Sherlock Holmes observed: 
'Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?' 
'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.' 
'The dog did nothing in the night-time.' 
'That was the curious incident,' remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
/d. 
51. Regression results are available from the authors on request. 
52. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
53. Our fmdings are consistent with an earlier and much smaller study of high-profile 
trademarks. Rosso & Jansen, supra note 29, at 93. Of course, it is possible that competitors are 
not buying trademarks as keywords because of the legal risks associated with doing so. We do not 
know for certain what the purchasing patterns would look like if there were no legal risks 
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trademarked good, or selling complementary goods and services. Trade-
mark owners are more than twice as likely as competitors to purchase any 
given trademark as a keyword. Competitor-only links usually do not 
account for a material share of paid ads. And competitor-only links also 
turn up in organic search results. 
These patterns mean that the overall risk of diversion and/or confusion 
is actually quite low. And a blanket ban on the sale of trademarks as 
keywords would either close down or dramatically curtail a market channel 
that can provide real benefits to consumers. Finally, the risk of consumer 
harm seems rather remote. We believe that trademark owners have 
challenged these practices for reasons that have little to do with the interests 
trademark law is intended to protect. As we noted in an earlier article: 
Trademark owners have a Lockean rights-based claim to profit from 
(and, to a reasonable extent, control) the property they have created, 
including the right to profit from the collateral value of their marks 
when used as Internet search terms. At the same time, Google has 
created and popularized the platform that makes the same trademarks 
valuable as search terms, and therefore has its own competing 
Lockean rights-based claim to profit from the sale of any and all 
search terms on that platform. Finally, consumers have diverse 
preferences and goals. Markets, together with the institutions that 
enable them, are typically best justified as means by which such 
preferences can be maximized. Some consumers that use a trade-
mark as a search term prefer to be able to choose from a diverse 
range of goods and services. The ads that accompany search results 
benefit them by supporting Google's free search services, and 
allowing them the opportunity to buy products that they were not 
necessarily thinking about, but were at least open to. Other 
consumers are only interested in products bearing the specific 
trademark they entered as a search term. They too benefit from the 
free search services that Google provides, and they can only be 
diverted if they click on the "wrong" paid ad. 
Given the complex nature of these competing claims - pitting 
rights against rights, and rights against social utility - we should 
stop pretending that these disputes present a straightforward legal 
associated with purchasing a competitor's trademarks. But, by 2012, when we did the Big Brands 
analysis, the drumbeat of litigation had slowed as it became increasingly apparent that it was 
difficult to win a keyword case. See Eric Goldman, Another Google Ad Words Advertiser Defeats 
Trademark Infringement Lawsuit, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2012, 12:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ eric go I dman/20 12/ 11 /08/ another -goo gle-adwords-advertiser -defeats-trademark-infringement 
-lawsuit ("Over the last dozen years, there have been countless trademark lawsuits over 
competitive keyword advertising . . . . However, only a few of those cases-about a dozen, by my 
count-have reached a final outcome in a United States court . . . . Of those, trademark owners 
rarely win .... "). Table 8 indicates that even with these reduced legal risks, the most frequent 
purchasers of the Big Brands were, without exception, not direct competitors. See supra Table 8. 
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issue that only requires the parsing of a trademark statute or the 
application of a multi-factor likelihood of confusion test. Indeed, 
analyzing these issues within the boundaries set by existing 
trademark doctrine, whether consumer confusion or dilution, ob-
scures the real choice that judges and legislators will have to make. 54 
Those with a historical bent may note that the entire episode bears an 
uncomfortable similarity to the efforts by the movie studios to ban Sony's 
video-cassette recorders, rather than adapt their business model to 
technological change.55 
That said, we do find that a small number of trademarks receive a 
heavily disproportionate share of competitor-only paid ads, even after we 
take account of the presence of competitor-only links in organic search 
results. Further research will be necessary to determine whether actionable 
confusion results for this small number of trademarks. Regardless of the 
number of affected trademarks, our findings should not be taken as a license 
for competitors to engage in true trademark infringement, whether online or 
offline. 
B. Search Engine Business Model(s) 
Search engines participate in a multi-sided market. Users receive free 
search and provide information about their needs and interests.56 Adver-
tisers receive access to those users (and information about them), and 
provide paid ads. 57 Search engines obtain revenue by selling ads. 58 
The results from the second and third data runs suggest that the three 
search engines we studied have adopted distinct business strategies. Google 
consistently has the fewest paid ads and the lowest percentage of 
trademarks with zero paid ads. Yahoo has the most ads and the highest 
percentage of trademarks with zero paid ads. Bing is somewhere in 
between-which is interesting, given that Bing took over Yahoo's back-
office search operations in 2009, more than a year before our first run. 59 It 
54. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 540--41. 
55. Derek Khanna, A Look Back at How the Content Industry Almost Killed Blockbuster and 
Netjlix (and the VCR), TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/27/how-the-
content-industry-almost-killed-blockbuster-and-netflix/. In his testimony before Congress in 
1982, Jack Valenti, the head of the Motion Picture Association of America, gave a sense of the 
content industry's take on the issues: "'I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer 
and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.'" !d. 
56. Rufus Pollock, Is Google the Next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in 




59. Peter Burrows, Yahoo Gives In to Microsoft, Gives Up on Search, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 29, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2009/ 
tc20090728_826397 .htm. 
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is also interesting that we find so many trademarks with zero ads, when 
selling ads is the primary revenue source for search engines. 60 And, ad 
listings in Bing and Yahoo are much more volatile than in Google, for 
reasons that are not obvious. It remains to be seen which of these three 
models is profit-maximizing in the long run, and the answer may well 
depend on the mix of users and advertisers served by each search engine. 
Our findings emphasize the dynamism of the search market, which 
complicates any firm conclusions about the optimal business model-even 
were that business model not subject to disruptive innovation by new 
entrants and existing competitors. 
C. Why Do Trademark Owners Purchase Their Own Trademarks as 
Keywords? 
Many trademark owners purchase their own trademarks as keywords. 
In some instances, trademark owners entirely (e.g., American Airlines and 
Apple) or largely (Gatorade) saturate the ad space. And, trademark owners 
have a clear preference for the first paid-ad space, accounting for fully 31% 
of first paid ads. 
What is the logic of such purchases? Presumably, trademark owners 
wish to ensure their sites are prominently featured, and they are not willing 
to rely on algorithmic search to do so. They also may be motivated by a 
defensive desire to keep competitors from buying their marks as 
keywords-or raising their competitors' costs if they insist on doing so. 
Google and other search engines profit from such purchases. 
Are such purchases cost-effective? The answer likely turns on a 
number of factors, including the visibility of the trademarked product in 
algorithmic search, the cost and effectiveness of the ads in question, and the 
identity and goals of the alternative purchasers of those ads. As we discuss 
above, one controlled study found that eBay's ad purchases were not cost-
effective-but it is not clear how generalizable those findings actually are.61 
And search engines have no incentive to de-bias trademark owners that fear 
the consequences if they fail to purchase such ads. 
The question is not a new one. A well-known 19th and 20th century 
retailer (John Wannamaker) famously observed that "half the money I 
spend on advertising is wasted, but I can never find out which half."62 The 
question is ultimately an empirical one-but it is certainly plausible that 
60. One possible explanation: each search engine might cut special deals with specific 
trademark owners, ensuring that no paid ads will appear. American Airlines may have agreed to 
settle its lawsuit against Google on this basis. See supra note 49. Regardless, it is unclear how 
common such agreements actually are, and we are doubtful that this fully explains the observed 
patterns. 
61. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
62. Blake et a!., supra note 31, at I. 
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such purchases may not be a cost-effective marketing strategy for the most 
prominent brands/trademark owners, given the likelihood they would be 
prominently featured in the algorithmic search results anyway and given the 
low frequency of keyword purchases by actual competitors. However, our 
data does not provide sufficient information with which to answer this 
question. 
D. The Perils of Casual Empiricism 
In our earlier article on the use of trademarks as keywords, we 
highlighted the perils of casual empiricism. 63 Our findings in this Article 
provide further evidence on the perils of casual empiricism. Intellectual 
property law should rest on a sounder footing. Casual empiricism may be 
an occupational hazard for lawyers, judges, and law professors, but enough 
already. 
VI. Conclusion 
Perceptions about the use of trademarks as keywords have been framed 
by litigation, with trademark owners suing direct competitors and search 
engines that sell the trademarks for use as keywords to direct competitors. 
That factual setting does occur but it is distinctly unrepresentative of the 
universe of transactions in which keywords are purchased. In the real 
world, the most frequent purchasers of keywords are those selling the 
trademarked goods and complementary goods and services, or trademark 
owners. 
Why does it matter who is purchasing trademarks as keywords? 
Public policy has been framed in the shadow of the disputes over the use of 
trademarks as keywords. Casual empiricism led judges to make a number 
of important assumptions about the underlying issues-but they were doing 
so in the context of highly unrepresentative exemplars. And it is almost 
always a mistake to develop public policy based on such unrepresentative 
exemplars. 64 
63. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 3, at 499-504. 
64. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 848 
(1998) ("Significant adverse consequences can follow when laws are based on false-hoods, half-
truths, and truths that are not generalizable .... "); David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An 
Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEXAS L. REv. 653, 660 (2006) ("From a public 
policy perspective, context (i.e., how the mine-run of situations where rescue is necessary are 
handled) matters a great deal more than the facts-however bad they may be--of any given non-
rescue matter in assessing the overall merits of the no-duty rule."). 
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Law is replete with examples of unintended consequences flowing 
from judicial decisions, regulation, and legislation that are based on similar 
casual empiricism. Even if we ignore the complex substantive issues that 
arise from attempting to apply trademark law to the purchase of keywords, 
history counsels caution in the development of public policy in this space. 
If we fail to heed this warning, the future of intellectual property law on the 
Internet will be deja vu all over again. 
* * * 
